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_a9781108588485 _c$120 _q(e-book) |
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| 024 | 7 |
_2DOI _ahttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588485 |
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| 040 |
_beng _cIN-MiVU |
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| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_221 _a616.89 _bTSO/P |
| 100 | 1 |
_aTsou, J. Y. _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPhilosophy of Psychiatry/ _cby Jonathan Y. Tsou _h[electronic resource] |
| 260 | 3 |
_aCambridge: _bCambridge University Press, _c2021. |
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| 300 | _ae-book containing 75 pages | ||
| 440 | 0 | _aElements in the Philosophy of Science | |
| 505 | 0 | _acontents 1 Introduction 2 Skepticism about Biological Psychiatry 2.1 Anti-Psychiatry and Labeling Theory 2.2 A Naturalistic Response to Skeptics of Biological Psychiatry 2.3 Some Mental Disorders are Constituted by Biological Mechanisms 3 Defining Mental Disorder 3.1 Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of Disease and Mental Disease 3.2 Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder 3.3 Natural Function, Biological Dysfunction, and Adaptationism 3.4 Harm, Values, and Philosophical Debates about Definitions 3.5 Proposal: Mental Disorders are Biological Kinds with Harmful Effects 4 Natural Kinds in Psychiatry 4.1 Natural Kinds in the Human Sciences, Projectability, and Essentialism 4.2 Hacking on Looping Effects and the Instability of Human Kinds 4.3 Psychiatric Classifications that Individuate Biological Kinds are Projectable 4.4 HPC Kinds, Social Mechanisms, and the Expression of Mental Disorders 4.5 Biological Kinds are Useful Objects of Psychiatric Classification 5 Psychiatric Classification and the Pursuit of Diagnostic Validity 5.1 Concepts of Diagnostic Validity 5.2 Most DSM Categories are Invalid 5.3 The DSM Should Classify Biological Kinds, Not Diseases 5.4 The RDoC: A Psychiatric Classification System for Research 5.5 What are Appropriate Targets of Psychiatric Classification? 5.6 The DSM, Pluralism, and Theoretical Transparency 6 Conclusion Acknowledgments Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science Footnotes | |
| 520 | _aJonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's diagnostic categories. The main argument defended by Tsou is that genuine mental disorders are biological kinds with harmful effects. This argument opposes the dogma that mental disorders are necessarily diseases (or pathological conditions) that result from biological dysfunction. Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of psychiatric categories. | ||
| 653 | 0 | 0 | _aPsychiatry |
| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_3https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588485 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588485 _yClick here |
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_2ddc _cEB |
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