| 000 -LEADER |
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03458nam a22002654a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
| control field |
IN-MiVU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
| control field |
20240514134223.0 |
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| 007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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240514s2021 xxka||||o|||| 001 0 eng d |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
| International Standard Book Number |
9781108588485 |
| Terms of availability |
$120 |
| Qualifying information |
(e-book) |
| 024 7# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER |
| Source of number or code |
DOI |
| Standard number or code |
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588485 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
| Language of cataloging |
eng |
| Transcribing agency |
IN-MiVU |
| 082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
| Edition number |
21 |
| Classification number |
616.89 |
| Item number |
TSO/P |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
| Personal name |
Tsou, J. Y. |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
| Title |
Philosophy of Psychiatry/ |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Jonathan Y. Tsou |
| Medium |
[electronic resource] |
| 260 3# - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Cambridge: |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2021. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
| Extent |
e-book containing 75 pages |
| 440 #0 - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
| Title |
Elements in the Philosophy of Science |
| 505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
| Formatted contents note |
contents<br/>1 Introduction<br/>2 Skepticism about Biological Psychiatry<br/>2.1 Anti-Psychiatry and Labeling Theory<br/>2.2 A Naturalistic Response to Skeptics of Biological Psychiatry<br/>2.3 Some Mental Disorders are Constituted by Biological Mechanisms<br/>3 Defining Mental Disorder<br/>3.1 Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of Disease and Mental Disease<br/>3.2 Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder<br/>3.3 Natural Function, Biological Dysfunction, and Adaptationism<br/>3.4 Harm, Values, and Philosophical Debates about Definitions<br/>3.5 Proposal: Mental Disorders are Biological Kinds with Harmful Effects<br/>4 Natural Kinds in Psychiatry<br/>4.1 Natural Kinds in the Human Sciences, Projectability, and Essentialism<br/>4.2 Hacking on Looping Effects and the Instability of Human Kinds<br/>4.3 Psychiatric Classifications that Individuate Biological Kinds are Projectable<br/>4.4 HPC Kinds, Social Mechanisms, and the Expression of Mental Disorders<br/>4.5 Biological Kinds are Useful Objects of Psychiatric Classification<br/>5 Psychiatric Classification and the Pursuit of Diagnostic Validity<br/>5.1 Concepts of Diagnostic Validity<br/>5.2 Most DSM Categories are Invalid<br/>5.3 The DSM Should Classify Biological Kinds, Not Diseases<br/>5.4 The RDoC: A Psychiatric Classification System for Research<br/>5.5 What are Appropriate Targets of Psychiatric Classification?<br/>5.6 The DSM, Pluralism, and Theoretical Transparency<br/>6 Conclusion<br/>Acknowledgments<br/>Philosophy of Science<br/>Philosophy of Science<br/>Footnotes<br/> |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
| Summary, etc. |
Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's diagnostic categories. The main argument defended by Tsou is that genuine mental disorders are biological kinds with harmful effects. This argument opposes the dogma that mental disorders are necessarily diseases (or pathological conditions) that result from biological dysfunction. Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of psychiatric categories. |
| 653 00 - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED |
| Uncontrolled term |
Psychiatry |
| 856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
| Materials specified |
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588485 |
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588485">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588485</a> |
| Link text |
Click here |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
|
| Koha item type |
E-Book |